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Two hundred plus Native villages in Alaska may join the legion of Indian 
groups in the long line before the gates of the Federal Acknowledgment Process 
established by Congress to alleviate and rationalize selection of those groups 
deserving of acknowledgment as Indian tribes (CFR Sec 83, 1985). 
Such a possibility might well seem absurd to those of you who have studied the 
pre-contact or modern lifestyle of Alaska Indians, Inuit, Yupik and Aleut. Their 
significant commitment to subsistence, their political autonomy in pursuit of a 
modern Native land claims settlement and their continuing residence in rural and 
traditional settings has long been a matter of both academic and political record. 
Yet for all of this, recent court opinions by the Alaska State Supreme Court and 
the 9th Circuit of the Federal system, as well as a flurry of Federal District Court 
decisions, have questioned whether Alaska Native villages were and are historical 
tribes and whether Congress had recognized them. Furthermore, successive 
amendments to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (the latest of which was 
signed into law only this year) have protected the undeveloped and unpledged land 
base afforded Native corporations under AN CSA, but at the same time made 
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strategic attempts to retribalize the land more risky because the sovereign immunity 
of Alaska tribes has been put into question by the courts. 
The state has taken a uniformly hostile position to the proposition that Alaska 
Native Villages are self-governing tribal entities. Its position, supported by the 
Alaska Congressional delegation, and quite clearly by a federal government that has 
for years been folding up its tents in Alaska, is directed at a strategy developed by 
some Alaska Native groups to breathe new life into often moribund tribal 
organizations as a prelude to retaking governmental authority over settlement land 
and even to persuading the Secretary oflnterior to reassume trust responsibilities. 
While the advocates of this retribalization strategy had long recognized that 
baseline questions of the jurisdiction and authority of tribal governments needed to 
be answered either by Congress or by the courts, it is unlikely that they anticipated 
that courts would demand showings that Alaska Native villages were historically 
tribes or had been federally recognized as tribes in the many years since the purchase 
from Russia of the Alaska territory from Russia. 
How could such an anomalous situation arise? There are many reasons. Alaska 
tribes never signed treaties with the federal government. Alaska's purchase 
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occurred at nearly the precise time that Congress determined to end the practice. 
Although Indian reservations of the kind found in "the lower 48" were contemplated 
during the Collier administration, the policy was resisted. With a single exception, 
only executive order reserves were established in some places for special purposes. 
The record of Congressional involvement with Alaska Natives is less clear than that 
of their counterparts in the rest of the United States, primarily because Alaska as a 
federal colony, poorly administered and scantily manned with federal and territorial 
personnel, did not derive from Congress precisely defined allocations of federal 
authority either in Congressional edicts or in administration of those edicts. Those in 
power on the scene, be they military agents, teachers, marshalls or others, 
improvised when authority was not clearly theirs to get the job done. Congress 
supported this improvisation. The careful buffering of state and federal authority 
necessary to separate Indian country from state sovereign domains in the Western 
states did not underlie Alaska territorial policy. 
Demographic pressures on Alaska Native populations, their hunting grounds 
and their villages, did not emerge with the threatening force that required elsewhere 
both careful Congressional delineation and on-the-ground enforcement by federal 
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personnel until the post-ANCSA era of the 1970s. Early court decisions, often 
motivated by matters distant from the issues they ultimately affected, matters such 
as liberation of the slaves or a failure of Congress to provide essential legal authority 
to the new territory, came to be read in later years as a denial of tribal sovereignty 
(Governor's Task Force, 1986). 
Even the Alaska Claims Settlement, an apparent extinguishment of aboriginal 
title, classically interpreted by both international law and the landmark decisions of 
Chief Justice John Marshall to be grounded in the premise that a pre-existent 
indigenous sovereign controlled the land, was so loaded in conditional language as to 
neither confirm nor deny the pre-existence of Alaska Native tribes or aboriginal title. 
Its design as unique Indian legislation that created both regional and village 
corporations and that benefited Alaska Natives as stockholders but not as enrolled 
tribal members left the legal and social environments more and not less confused 
when basic issues of tribal sovereignty were considered. 
In Indian legislation which has emerged from the Congress during the 1970s to 
further self-determination and Native child care, Congress has used the tribal label 
in ways which watered down its focus upon village tribes by including other entities 
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as special purpose tribes to facilitate contracting and administration. Alaska Native 
villages were induced by the language of AN CSA, especially its award of the village 
core to state-chartered municipalities, to form state chartered local governments. 
Those villages which resisted were punished with threatened withdrawal of state 
funds. Alaska villages were identified for federal Indian law purposes as those 
designated in ANCSA. Lists of tribal entities prepared by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs separated Alaska villages from other Indian tribes and, in some cases, either 
advertently or inadvertently, left previously identified villages off the lists. 
During the first ANCSA decade white population shifts to rural Alaska made 
the possibility of non-Native electoral control in some places a reality. Although a 
subsistence preference was grafted onto the Alaska National Interest Land and 
Conservation Act (ANILCA) to replace aboriginal hunting and fishing rights 
extinguished by ANCSA, the preference was afforded "rural residents" and not 
Alaska Natives. 
At every turn, village tribes were left out of negotiations. At the village level, 
residents were granted fee simple title to their home sites. State services and federal 
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services contracted away to neotribal non-profit corporations replaced direct federal 
services. Bureau oflndian Affairs offices closed their doors. 
Yet for all of this, Alaska Native villages were never directly terminated by 
Congress no more than they were explicitly recognized as tribes (according to their 
opponents). Whether historically present or not, they were encouraged to become 
inactive as functioning governments. 
In its passage of the 1988 ANCSA amendments, Congress included an explicit 
disclaimer as to the new act's impact on Alaska tribal sovereignty and left the matter 
for the courts to unravel. The court decisions of relevance either assumed the absence 
of tribal authority, either inherent or Congressionally designated, or demanded an 
historical accounting from litigants. It is this demand that brings me to your session. 
For, if anyone is to save Alaska Natives from the lengthy and burdensome task of 
reidentifying themselves, it is the scholars before me, especially those of you with 
expertise in ethnohistory and archival research. 
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In Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management and Planning_(19BB), the Alaska State Supreme Court held that "[t]he history of the relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives up to the passage of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act (citation omitted) indicates Congress intended that most Alaska Native Groups not be treated as sovereigns. [N]either the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act, nor subsequent Congressional acts have signaled a change from non-sovereign to sovereign status" (Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Slip No. 3320 at 6). While the dissent agreed with this conclusion, it argued that the case be remanded to give the village an opportunity to make a factual showing as to its alleged tribal status (Stevens at 44). It recommended that the Montoya decision (see below) and federal acknowledgment criteria be employed as "guidelines, that may be tailored to accommodate the unique history and circumstances of Alaska." (Stevens at 47.) After the State Supreme Court denied a motion for rehearing, Stevens Village decided to bring an entirely new test case rather than appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
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Court. That case would have a heavily documented record to demonstrate the 
village's historical status as a tribe. 
In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1834 (9th Cir. 1988) the Federal 
Appeals Court has deferred upon ruling on the village's sovereign immunity, its 
power to tax non-Indians and the jurisdiction of its tribal court over Indian country 
until the record is enlarged to determine the existence of tribal status as defined in 
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp. 592 F.2d 575, 582-588 (1st Cir 1979). 
The Mashpee case relied on the baseline definition of Montoya v. United States, 
180 U.S. 261, 266, 21 S. Ct. 358, 359, 45 L.Ed. 521 (1901): 
By a «tribe" we understand a body of Indians of the same or similar race 
united in a community under one leadership or government, and 
inhabiting a partici ular though sometimes ill-defined territory. 
(Marshpee, quoting Montoya at 582). 
While acknowledging that leadership or tribal government could not be 
expected to compete with the state government, the court sought to discover 
leadership which had some significant effect upon a core group. This ruling out of a 
need to prove an ability to compete with the state for power over the Indians in 
question is a significant plus for evaluation of Alaska data. 
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Leadership also was not cast as coercive or binding but rather as leadership 
over "a way of life" (Mashpee at 584), leadership which was passed forward in good 
times and in bad (585). 
Such village leadership can be documented in the Alaska context as it dealt 
with a myriad of government agents and defined the community's position on matters 
ranging from school policy and attendance to alcohol problems. 
The court determined that tribes would no longer exist if they became 
assimilated into the general society (Mashpee at 585). As an Indian community 
rather than a community of Indians, boundaries could be established which are 
either geographic or created through societal prejudice, specifically discrimination by 
whites against Indians. The term "boundary" was said to be anthropological as it 
expressed group social consciousness (Mashpee at 486). 
Once found to exist in a historical moment, the tribe would not be said to cease 
to exist unless it chose to voluntarily abandon its tribal status by giving up its role as 
a distinct society. 
The Mashpee court viewed as supportive of a lower court verdict against 
Mashpee tribal status a 1869 legislative hearing in which community members 
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voted to remove restrictions on alienation of land to obtain citizenship, this as 
evidence of abandonment of a communal outlook for personal advancement. 
However, it was equally prepared to weigh as nonpersuasive of voluntary tribal 
abandonment and even exculpatory, evidence of coercion from outside the community 
in the form of governmental dealings and the presence of outsiders (Mashpee at 589 
and 591). 
Since ANCSA was passed as a unilateral Congressional settlement to change 
the status of land without direct village consent, only the prospective use of the 
powers granted shareholders in the 1988 amendments to vote to ''opt out" of the 
restrictions on stock alienation now permanently imposed on villages (other than 
those in the Bristol Bay and Aleut regions who may be required to vote to retain such 
restrictions or "opt in") might be viewed as a similar voluntary decision to transpose 
1 
the Native land base for individual reasons. 
The heart of the Mashpee test is that once a distinct Indian community guided 
by Native leaders is discovered, it is sufficient to confirm that later decisions of its 
Even this is not a direct decision to change the character of settlement land since it 
is held as an asset of the corporation. Village land (other than home sites) under the 
1988 amendments is immune from outside taxation or attachment unless the 
corporation votes to pledge or to develop it. Venetie chose to take its former reserve 
in fee simple and to transfer its land base to a tribal entity, a clear choice to retain its 
communal flavor, even absent federal protection. 
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members have not lead to a voluntary transformation from an Indian community to a 
community of Indians. With the court prepared to examine completely the external 
pressures which so often cause an outside observer to misread enforced integration as 
apparent assimilation in order to secure valuable services and legal rights to persons, 
community and property, this judicial test offers as the Federal Acknowledgment test 
does not, an opportunity for a complex understanding of decisions made by Alaska 
Natives in an environment replete with governmental pressures and administrative 
confusion. 
Alaska Natives will not be punished for their desire to selectively adapt their 
lives within modernizing Alaska society so long as the focus of their attention was 
upon group survival and group identity. They should not be viewed as assimilated 
under the Mashpee test because the price for schools, a confirmed land base and other 
modern needs was often submission to a variety of legal and administrative regimes 
which they neither controlled nor defined. 
This particularized examination of the interplay of federal, territorial and state 
agents with Alaska Native villages appears to be a superior way to examine tribal 
viability than the Secretary of Interior's requirement that Indian groups 
- 1 1  -
demonstrate tribal political influence or other authority over their members as an autonomous entity throughout history until the present in seeming isolation from the interaction between that group and outside forces. See 25 CFR sec. 83 7(c) (1985). 
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Dealings with Alaska villages as Indian Entities: Alaskan Examples 
Historian Stephen Haycox of the University of Alaska has supported the call for 
archival research to unravel the unusual allocation of responsibilities for dealing 
with Alaska Native villages in territorial times. (See Haycox in Conn and Garber, 
1981: Appendix 1-16.) His description of education is illustrative. 
He traces the role of private teacher-missionaries lead by Dr. Sheldon Jackson, 
formerly superintendent of missions, who contracted with sects (as a general agent 
for education) to establish schools in twenty-seven villages. 
From 1905 the Bureau of Education maintained an expanded organization 
of services until 1931, including first medical services through itinerant 
doctors and nurses and four Native hospitals, then boarding school and 
orphanages and finally a marketing agent and warehouse in Seattle for 
distribution of Alaska Native hand-crafted items. (Haycox in Conn and 
Garber, 1981:3) 
The multi-purpose role of these missionaries, then teachers, did not stop with 
this realm of activities. Teachers worked to organize village councils and sought and 
received law enforcement authority from Congress to deal with territorial law 
violators (Cohen, 1982:764). The Bureau's agents established cooperative stores and 
guided commercial reindeer herding. 
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The Bureau of Education was absorbed by the Alaska Native Service and still 
later by the Bureau oflndian Affairs. Initially, it was the Bureau oflndian Affairs in 
Alaska. 
On another front, that of liquor control, federal responsibility for articulation 
and implementation of policy flowed through so many discrete governmental 
agencies as to nearly defy logical explanation. Among them were the Army, the 
Navy, Revenue Cutters, the customs agent, teachers and missionaries, U.S. 
Marshalls, and U.S. Commissionarers, Indian police, special territorial employees for 
the supression of liquor among the Natives, and traditional and Indian 
Reorganization Act village councils ( Conn and Moras, 1986). 
These examples of non-traditional (and even illegal) allocations of legal 
authority by the federal government suggest a non-traditional implementation of 
federal trust repsonsibility and not an absence of an Indian policy. Bits and pieces of 
that policy (e.g., Indian police) were borrowed from late reservation policies. Others 
were pure innovations. What is critical is that the rationale for education and the 
rationale for liquor control were employed as justifications for placing personnel in 
contact with Alaska Native communities for other purposes. These agents reported 
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on their contacts and were allowed to expand on their original missions with 
Congressional approval. 
Teachers became deputies and instigators of economic enterprise. Navy and 
Army officers became the de facto Indian agents as did the Captains of Revenue 
Cutters to Eskimo villages. 
What resulted then was a federal Indian policy that defied ready comparison 
with that of the rest of the country but whose implementation was funded by the 
Congress and whose details were reported back as a spur to further funding and 
involvement. (See Conn and Moras, 1986:25). 
The impact of the unusual Indian policy in Alaska is as clear for researchers as 
it is apparently unclear for modern-day jurists who look for clarity in Congressional 
legislation and in court decisions removed from the Alaska realm by distance and, 
more importantly, by a lack of appreciation for Alaska's legal culture and history. 
The source of information on governmental contact that is most critical for 
Alaska Natives are archival records including: 
1. military records 
2. church-missionary records 
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3. educational records 
4. village council records 
5. journals and diaries of government agents including teachers, marshalls, 
liquor supression agents 
6. Alaska Native Service records 
7. Bureau of Education records 
8. territorial records and reports 
9. Bureau oflndian Affairs records 
10. lower court records including briefs and supporting documents 
11 reports to Congress and hearings attendant to appropriations of many 
programs. 
Few of the above documents are found in law libraries. The extent that they 
break faith with the usual division of legal responsibilities can be explained as a 
logical departure, given the level of governmental involvement in Alaska. It may be 
that federal recognition can be argued from a study of these records (see below). But 
even if federal recognition by Congress through its appropriation process cannot be 
discovered, the documents will offer powerful evidence of federal appreciation of 
discrete, self-governing Native tribes. In fact, but for a continuous level of Native 
self-government, a pattern of action that continued into statehood days, federal 
- 16  -
governmental presence would not have been so random, so limited and so incomplete. 
The mission of researchers is, then, to enter the federal archives and the private 
respositories of these archival records and to mine these documents for evidence now 
demanded by the courts and by Congress. 
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Many of you, especially those knowledgeable of Indian law and the Alaska situation, will agree with village advocates and federal Indian law specialists that there should be no fundamental dispute over the historical and modern existence of Alaska Native tribes or their recognition. Congress has never repealed its adoption of an amendment to the Indian Reorgaization Act which provided that villages could adopt constitutions to facilitate their self-government. Sixty plus villages did formalize their tribal status under IRA. You may agree with Indian advocates that the principal mandate for Alaska Native villages is that they employ the powers they claim to possess and demonstrate present-day rather than historical viability. Clusters of villages throughout Alaska are actively reinvigorating their tribal governments and renewing their credibility among residents, leaving it to their attorneys to meet challenges in court. However, whether deserved or undeserved, the persistent legal attacks by the state and overt hostility to tribes evidenced by the federal administration has had an impact on jurists who now force Indian law attorneys to marshall an historical and ethnological record not usually demanded in the courts when the political question of federal recognition has been settled by the Congress. For these jurists, the question 
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of Congressional recognition has been clouded by a confused and qualified pattern of 
legislation, legislation which has protected settled lands in the hands of Native 
corporations left themselves unprotected from bankruptcy petitions. Until and 
unless that record is clarified, jurists will force Alaska Native villages who test the 
scope and realm of their political powers to establish both their historical and modern 
existence as well as their historical recognition by means of evidence not available in 
law libraries, but in repositories better known to scholars than to attorneys,. 
For those who have struggled to prepare petitions for the Federal 
Acknowledgment Process, the Mashpee (or judicially prescribed) test of tribes 
provides one element which is vastly superior to the administrative formulation. It 
allows researchers to demonstrate and to document how governmental policy caused 
tribal units to enter into periods of relative inactivity. Thus researchers can analyze 
and report on the impact of federal (territorial, state and local) actions on Indian 
groups which caused them to exist for periods of time as social groups apparently 
subject to governance from other sources. Even if the group dissembled for a time 
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and apparently was forced to assimilate with other groups by reason of federal or 
other governmental policy, this, also, can be explained. 
The inability of petitioners in the Federal Acknowledgment Process to 
demonstrate the impact of external governmental policy on active tribalism 
including the impact of periodic failures of the federal government to effectively 
implement Congressionally-mandated responsibilities is, to my mind, the core failure 
of logic in the federal acknowledgment process now available to Indian groups and 
their petitioners. It would be deadly in the case of Alaska villages. 
The value of Mashpee's test in the Alaska context is especially clear. 
Researchers can address both the curious allocation of authority for dealing with 
villages by non-Indian agency personnel as well as the development of policy (ton the 
ground" as they demonstrate its impact on Alaska Native governance. This same 
body of research may lay the basis for a second argument, that the process of federal 
recognition occurred in a situational context which required Congress to address in 
unusually broad terms its tribal recognition, leaving to executive agents and even to 
available local authorities the responsibility for filling in the details of that core 
federal recognition. If research develops a picture which not only validates the 
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historical governance and continuity of the Alaska Native tribes, but better 
documents and explains Alaska Indian policy, it will cause jurists to desist from 
further demands that Alaska villages prove that they are tribes. The well-grounded 
rule of federal Indian law is that once federal recognition has been determined, courts 
defer from further inquiry into tribal existence so long as comm uni ties remain 
distinctly Indian. 
The research proposed to meet tests of historical existence and federal 
recognition will in the case of Alaska Natives sustain a further requirement of the 
courts that tribes demonstrate that they still exist. 
Alaska villages present a mysterious picture to those federal Indian law 
specialists in search of traditional legal symbols for federally-recognized tribes. They 
have been enrolled in a land settlement as rural and distinctly Native communities 
but placed upon non-trust land and not on reservations. They have been encouraged 
through Congressional activity to form state-chartered municipalities and to hold 
their land base in state-chartered corporations. At the same time the federal 
government has contracted away much of its social service repsonsibility to non-
p ro fi t  Native corporations,  special -purpose  tr ibes ,  and  induced  
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the state to organize regionally-based school systems. This process of delegation of 
responsibility to non-federal agents and failure to rearticulate classical 19th century 
tribal models - trust land and tribal councils - has induced village Alaskans to work 
within structures often unfamiliar to reservation tribes or to federal Indian law 
experts. At the same time artifacts of the Indian Reorganization Act have often been 
less significantly used. 
The historical research important to current judicial tests could explain this 
pattern of governance as a continuation of a historical pattern of federal recognition 
and effectuation of trust responsibilities. It could lend credence to the position of 
tribal advocates that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement employed new structures 
to fulfill Constitutional responsibilities - that it placed old wine in new corporate and 
municipal bottles because this made historical and modern sense in the Alaska 
context. Congressional policy could be validated as "self-determination without 
termination," as Richard Nixon termed the Alaska Claims Settlement Act. 
A pattern of dealing with Alaska Natives and their tribes, if well documented, 
could then lift the veil of mystery from a confused pattern of Congressional acts and 
court decisions. 
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Rarely have scholars and their work been so critical to the legal survival - and some would argue the cultural survival - of indigenous people in North America. At stake is much more than avoidance of a crowd at the door of the Federal Acknowledgment Process; at stake is the ultimate protection of one-half of the Indian land base in the United States and confirmation of the legal identities of the tribal communities who desire to govern that land. 
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